lyfilitary (jrder -^i^- 



of tt)C 






of tl^c 



-H§^ 



United ^tates 



COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



[^sssssnia 



WAR PAPER 49. 



^qe Rattle of Stoqe RiOei 



•HH- 



Military ©rder of \\}Q boycil be^ion 



United States. 



CDMMANDE[(Y OF THE DI^TI^ICT OF COLUpA 

WAR PAPERS. 

49 

THe Bailie GT Slone I\_iver. 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Major 

HENRY Ml KENDALL, 

U. S. Army, 

AND 
READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF NOVEMBER 4, 1903. 



.17 



■1^ 






Mt §attk of ^tom §ivn\ 



After the battle of Perryville, October S, 1S62, a rather leis- 
urely pursuit of Bragg's retreating forces was made on the roads 
to Cumberland Gap, but no engagement was brought on. It 
soon appeared that Bragg did not intend to again give battle in 
Kentucky, but would withdraw into Tennessee and join the 
force under Breckenridge which had been left to watch Nashville 
during the invasion of Kentucky. Buell concluded that Bragg 
would concentrate his entire force near Nashville and endeavor 
to capture that place and somewhere in its vicinity fight a deci- 
sive battle which would determine the fate of West Tennessee 
and Kentucky. Buell therefore discontinued his pursuit and 
turned his forces toward Nashville, placing them mainly at 
Bowling Green, Glasgow, and other points on the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad. 

A great deal of pressure had been brought to bear upon the 
Administration to make a campaign in East Tennessee, a moun- 
tainous region whose people were mostly loyal. General Halleck 
in Washington planned a campaign in that region and called 
upon Buell to carry it out. But Buell declined. His reasons 
were that sucii a campaign would place him at a long distance 
from Louisville, his base, dependent upon wagon transportation 
alone over almost impassable roads, in a country devoid of sup- 
plies and especially suitable to defensive operations. Again, he 
would be forced to make great detachments to guard Nashville 
and his lines of communications, since these would be especially 
open to the attack of the enemy, who was well known to b^ 
superior in cavalry. 



Buell considered Nasb\ille the vital point of the theatre, and was 
satisfied that it would be the main point of Bragg's attack. . He 
therefore ignored Halleck's elaborate plan and set about repair- 
ing the railway to Nasiiville and moving his troops in that direc- 
tion. His previous slowness and indecision had brought him 
greatly into disfavor, "and on the 30th of October he was relieved 
by Major-General William S. Rosecrans. The district was 
called thereafter the Department of the Cumberland and the 
army in the field was designated as the Fourteenth Army Corps. 
Halleck's plans were urged u])on Rosecrans, but he was of the 
same opinion as Buell, and it liad In that time become plain 
that Bragg was doing just what Buell thougiit he would do. 
Rosecrans concluded to go on in the same direction as had Buell. 
and the events showed clearly that Halleck's bureau-made plans, 
based upon theor\' alone and without an intimate knowledge of 
the real conditions, were the veriest nonsense, and that Buell and 
Rosecrans were quite right in ignoring them. 

Rosecrans organized the army into right wing, center, and left 
wing. The right wing, under McCook, consisted of Johnson's, 
Davis's, and Sheridan's divisions. Thomas commanded the cen- 
ter, which consisted of five divisions under Rousseau, Negley. 
Fry, Mitchell, and Reynolds. The left wing was commanded iw 
Crittenden, and comprised Wood's, Palmer's' and Van Cleve's 
divisions. The total available strength of the army formed not 
more than 60 per cent, of its paper strength, owing to al)senteeisin. 
Every endeavor was made to remedy this state of afiairs, a con- 
dition not peculiar to this army alone, but affecting all the armies 
almost equally, and constituting a serious evil, for the correction 
of which severe measures were an absolute necessity. 

The army was very deficient in cavalry, and a large portion of 
its meagre force was very poorly armed. In this condition the 
army was at a great disadvantage opposed to Bragg, whose cav- 
alry, under Forrest, Morgan, ami Wheeler was much greater in 
numt)crs and i)etter mountetl and equipped. 



Rosecrans iiKuic strt-nuous eHbrts to improve the condition of 
his cavalry, and succeeded in increasing- it to about 4,000 and in 
ol)taining Stanley to conunand it. But at its greatest strength it 
was less than half the opposing cavalry force. 

Rosecrans' future base of operations was Nashville, but he 
would be dependent for supplies upon the maintenance of the 
railroad to Louisville. He hastened to increase the garrison of 
Nashville, but could not for some time concentrate there owing 
to the destruction of a railway tunnel near Mitchellsville, which 
limited him to wagon transportation over bad roads for thirty- 
live miles. The railway was opened November 26th, and the 
army was then concentrated near Nashville, with the exception 
of Reynolds' division and all but one brigade of Fry's, which 
were assigned the duty of protecting the railway. 

Before advancing it was absolutely essential to place in Nash- 
ville a large supply of rations, ammunition, etc., sufficient to 
support the army during the longest probable break in the rail- 
way, as a result of the forays of the rebel cavalry. This required 
an entire month, and the administration was greatly dissatisfied 
at the long delay. Rosecrans went through an experience very 
similar to that suffered by Thomas at the same place later in the 
war. But to the threats to relieve him he made the blunt reply 
that if confidence did not exist he was perfectly ready to turn over 
the command and abide by the issue. Halleck then explained 
that it was not intended to threaten him, but that there was o-reat 
anxiety in Washington over the slow course of events in Tennes- 
see. He explained that this arose from diplomatic reasons. It 
had been greatly desired that a decided advantage be gained over 
the rebels before the opening of the British Parliament, otherwise 
the advocates of intervention in favor of the Confederacy would 
be able to point to the possession of Tennessee as a proof that 
the South was gaining on the North. It would seem, however, 
that this was only one of the long series of attempts by Halleck 



to run tlic war from an office in Washington— a course tlmt never 
did and never could result in any good. 

Rosecrans continued his preparations carefully, and Bragg con- 
cluded that he was going into winter quarters at Nashville. 
Bragg therefore placed his army in winter quarters at Murfrees- 
boro' and vicinity, and detached his cavalry for operations in 
West Tennessee and against the railway in Kentucky. This 
was just what Rosecrans wanted. He wanted Bragg to draw 
near to Nashville so that his own line of communications might 
be short and a reverse less disastrous. Rosecrans was also 
anxious that the rebel cavalry should be distant when he advanced, 
as his army was very deficient in cavalry. 

Morgan's cavalry made a raid upon Hartsville, U'ennessee, 
and on the 7th of December captured a brigade of infantrv placed 
there by Thomas to guard the crossing of the Cumberland. The 
capture of this biigade was due to neglect of the simplest pre- 
cautions. No outposts or sentinels of any kind seem to have 
been used, and the rebel cavalry was in line only 400 yards 
away before it was discovered. The infantry turned out in great 
disorder and was badly managed, so that it was forced to sur- 
render. No word was sent to a supporting brigade but a few 
miles away, and Morgan was allowed to get away without anv 
loss. He then started for Kentucky and on the 27th of December 
captured Elizabethtown and destroyed a large section of railwav. 
He kept on to Muldraugh's Hills and destroyed two trestles, 
each about 500 feet long and 90 feet high. The railwa\- com- 
munication was thus effectually broken, and if Rosecrans had 
remained in Nashville the condition of his army would have 
been critical. But having completed his preparations and find- 
ing the conditions favorable, owing to the absence of Bragg's 
cavalry, Rosecrans advanced from Nashville on the 26th of 
December. 

Mitchell's division was left to garrison Nashville so that 



Tliomas's command was reduced to Necjley's and Rousseau's 
divisions and Walker's brigade of Fry's. McCook's and Critten- 
den's wings were on the pikes soutii and southeast of Nashville. 
The main body of Bragg's force, consisting of Polk's corps and 
part of Breckenridge's division of Hardee's corps, was at Mur- 
treesboro'. The remainder of Hardee's corps was near Eagles- 
ville, about twenty miles west of Murfreesboro', McCown's 
division of Hardee's corps, with a division under vStevenson, 
formed a separate corps under Kirby Smith at Readyville, twelv^ 
miles east of Murfreesboro'. 

Rosccrans' plan was to advance in three columns, refusing his 
right. McCook's corps was to use the Nolensville pike, Thomas 
the Franklin Pike, and Crittenden the main Murfreesboro' pike. 
McCook was to attack Hardee and if the enemy held his ground 
and was reinforced Thomas was to support McCook, If, how- 
ever, Hardee retreated, McCook was to detach a division to 
pursue or observe him and move with the remainder of his corps 
so as to come in on the left rear of the main rebel force. Crit- 
tenden was to attack supported by Thomas, whose force was to 
be directed against the enemy's left. 

McCook advanced and after skirmishing all day, followed by 
a brisk fight towards evening, took possession of Nolensville 
and the heights about one and one-half miles in front. Thomas 
followed on the right, closing Negley's division on Nolensville 
and leaving Rousseau's division on the right flank. Crittenden 
advanced to LaVergne, with heavy skirmishing, through a rough 
country, intersected by forests and cedar brakes. 

On the 27th, McCook advanced on Triune, but his move- 
ments were retarded by a dense fog, which made it impossible 
to tell friend from foe. Stanley, with the greater part of the 
cavalry, had joined McCook, and in the fog the cavalry was 
fired upon by the infantry. The march was stopped until the 
fog lifted, and Triune was therefore not reached until late in 
the day, although it was only seven miles from Nolensville. 



8 

TliuiDus moved eastward to Crittenden's rijijht. Crittenden 
moved forward slowly, delaying his movements until the action 
of McCook's corps should determine the real state of aflairs. 
Thomas was now in position to support either McCook or Crit- 
tenden, as the case might require. 

On the 28th, McCook made sure by a strong reconnaisance 
that Hardee was retreating, and Thomas closed on Crittenden, 
who remained in position, bringing up his trains and making 
ready for battle. 

On the 29th, McCook left one brigade of Johnson's division 
at Triune to cover the right and rear, and advanced to within 
about six miles of Murfreesboro'. The corps was encamped in 
line of battle with Sheridan's division on the left, Davis in the 
center, and Johnson on the right. Negley's division of Thomas's 
corps advanced in support of Crittenden's corps, the head and 
flank of which reached a point about two miles from Murfrees- 
boro' ; Rousseau's division remained at Stewartsboro'. It was 
now plain that the enemy would give battle near Murfreesboro'. 
During the afternoon a report reached Rosecrans from Palmer 
that he was in sight of Murfreesboro' and the enemy was run- 
ning. He therefore ordered Crittenden to occupy Murfreesboro' 
with a division. Crittenden sent a brigade across Stone's river 
and surprised a regiment of Breckenridge's division and pushed 
it back on the main line. It was found that the rebels were 
occupying a strong position in force, and, it being then dark, the 
brigade was withdrawn across the river. Fords were pre- 
pared by the pioneer brigade. Negley's, Palmer's and Wood's 
divisions were in line with Van Cleve's division in reserve. 

On the 30th, Rousseau moved up and took position in reserve 
in rear of Palmer's right. Negley advanced slightly as did 
McCook's corps. The line generally faced east, but part of 
McCook's right division was retired so that it faced to the south. 

Rosecrans now decided to give battle on the 31st, and made 



the foUowiiii;- [)l;iii : McCouk was to liuUl strong gi'ouml, refus- 
ing his right, and make strong dispositions to resist the attack of 
the enemy. If, however, the enemy did not attack, McCook 
was to attack sufficient to hoKi all the force on his front and 
prevent the enemy from detaching any troops to the right, the 
real point of attack. Thomas' corps and Palmer's division were 
to open with skirmishing and engage the enemy's center and 
left as far as Stone river. Van Cleve's division was to cross the 
river and advance on Breckenridge, followed by Wood's division 
by brigades on its right, and carry everything before them into 
Murfreesboro'. In front of Crittenden's corps across the river 
was high ground, the occupation of which would enable an 
enfilade 'fire to be brought on the remainder of Polk's corps. 
Palmer and Thomas were to follow the movement, advancing in 
its support. After taking Murfreesboro', Crittenden was to 
move westward and getting in on the flank and rear of the enemy 
drive them oft' their line of communications. The success of the 
whole plan of course depended upon McCook's being able to 
hold on without support, and Rosecrans criticised his line, 
saying it was an error for it to face so much to the east. He 
thought it should rather face to the south and impressed the fact 
on McCook that he must be careful and make a strong disposi- 
tion. McCook was ordered also to build fires to his right pro- 
longing the general line and simulating the camps of a large 
force. It was hoped in this way to draw oft a large part of the 
rebel force from the real point of attack. 

Bragg formed an exactly similar plan of attack. Hardee with 
two divisions was to advance on the left and force back the 
Union right. Then Polk was to push the center. By a steady 
wheel to the right on the right of Polk's corps as a pivot the 
Union force was to be thrown back on Stone river, oft' its line to 
Nashville, the objective of his campaign. The plans being iden- 
tical a good deal depended on which army began the movement 



lO 

first. Rosecrans' orders were for the attack to begin at 
seven o'clock, while Brac^g orderetl the attack to begin at 
daylight. 

Rosecrans' movement began on time and for a time was going 
very successfully. But about 6.30 A. M. the enemy in force 
attacked McCook's right and found that the two brigades were 
weaklv posted, without support, the remaining brigade of John- 
son's division being nearly a mile and a half to the rear at John- 
son's headquarters. The command was not in any way ready 
for battle. The horses of some of the batteries were being 
watered at the stream and the men of one brigade were cooking 
breakfast. Kirk's brigade, the first attacked, tried to make some 
resistance and called for help upon VV'^illich's brigade, but Will- 
ich was absent at headquarters and his brigade was without a 
commander and made no etlbrt to support Kirk. Both brigades 
were quicklv rolled up. Baldwin's brigade, in reserve, was 
moved up, but was too far distant, and the rout of the other two 
brigades was complete before assistance could be rendered. The 
weight of the attack then fell upon Baldwin, whose brigade, with 
Simonson's Fifth Indiana Battery, succeeded in checking the 
assailants and inflicting heavy loss, but was soon forced to retire 
to avoid being surrounded. 

Meanwhile a severe attack had been made all along McCook's 
front, and after the rout of Johnson's division the flank of Davis's 
division was exposed. The enemy's attack was repulsed, but he 
soon reformed, brought up his reserves and renewed the attack. 
The attack was again repulsed. Davis's division now formed 
almost a right angle with Sheridan's, and the rebels directed the 
next attack on the vertex of the angle. Davis's division was 
driven out of its position, being greatly overlapped, and Sheridan 
had to withdraw his right, gaining time to do so bv charging 
with Robert's brigade. His new line was at right angles to his 
first position. Here he held on desperately, trying to reform the 



II 

l)iokcn division to his ri<:^ht. After rcpiilsiiir^ several attacks, his 
amimmition was exliaustcd and he was forced to fall hack, as was 
also Negley. whose division had Ijeen heavily engaged in front 
and afterward on the right flank. 

Word had been sent to Rosecrans soon after seven o'clock that 
McCook's corps was heavily pressed and needed assistance. But 
he did not realize the extent of the disaster, and it was not until 
informed by a second messenger that the right wing was being 
driven that he realized the true state of affairs. He found then 
that he must abandon his plan and take every means to prevent 
the terrible disaster that seemed imminent. He directed the 
movement on the left to be suspended and placed Rousseau's 
division in the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan. 
As soon as it became plain, from the great amount of fugitives, 
that McCook's wing was routed, Van Cleve's division was 
placed on the right of Rousseau's, and a brigade of Wood's divis- 
ion to its right. Negley's and vSheridan's divisions fell back upon 
this new line. Upon this line the rebels made four distinct 
attacks, but were repulsed with very heavy losses. The 
fighting was almost hand to hand, and the losses on both 
sides were heavy. That of the regular brigade was espec- 
ially severe, being 637 out of a total of 1.566. The new 
line succeeded in holding its ground and driving back the 
enemy from its front. 

The left had also had severe fighting, becoming gradually 
engaged as Bragg's turning movement went on. As the change 
of front went on the left became more important until when the 
final line was formed, close to the Nashville turnpike, the left 
became the vital point, since a disaster there would have per- 
mitted the line to be enfiladed and the stragglers would have 
carried any resulting disorder along the whole line. During the 
afternoon Breckenridge made several heavy assaults on Palmer's 
division, but was repulsed. 



12 

Ro.sccr;ins succccclfcl in placing his troops in rather a stron,g' 
line near the road, and the snbsequent assaults ot" the enemy were 
repelled. The army slept in the position, spare ammuni- 
tion was issued and found to be sufficient for another bat- 
tle. The left was withdrawn slightly to more advantageous 
giound, and Rosecrans determined to await the attack of 
the enemy in his new lines, but if Bragg did not attack to 
do so himself. 

During the morning of the ist of January the rebels made 
repeated attempts to advance on Thomas's front, but were re- 
pulsed. During the afternoon the enemy massed a large number 
of troops in front of the right but did not attack. Bragg's object 
was evidently to feel the Union lines and find out if Rosecrans 
was retreating. Satisfied that he was not, he felt himself unable 
to attack in view of the heavy hammering his army had received 
the day before. Rosecrans passed Van Cleve's division across 
the stream and occupied some hills which threatened Polk's lines 
in enfilade. Next day Bragg tried to drive back Van Cleve's 
division, which was commanded bv Colonel Beatty. The move- 
ment failed after severe fighting. During the night Bragg 
massed his force on his former right and Rosecrans greatlv 
strengthened his left. 

On the 3d Bragg caused a constant picket firing to be kept up 
to determine if Rosecrans was still holding on. Finding that 
such was the case he concluded, after consultation with his 
generals, to retreat. He retreated in good order, his cavalry 
holding Murfreesboro' until the ^th. On the ^th Thomas's entire 
command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Mur- 
freesboro'. The object of the campaign had been accomplished. 
Up to the 31st everything had gone favorably for the Union 
Army ; the fighting of the morning of the 31st had been all in 
Bragg's favor, and had almost resulted in the total defeat of 
Rosecrans ; but from that time on, evervthing had again been in 



13 

Rosecrans' favor. His losses were on the whole greater than 
those of Bragg, but the hitter's retieat gave the victory to 
Rosecrans. 

Rosecrans' force on the battlefield was 43,400 ; his losses were 
13,249, more than thirty per cent. Bragg's total force on the 
field was 44,750, and his loss 13,334, about 28 per cent. Rose- 
crans lost 28 pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon 
train, but Bragg lost only three pieces of artillerv. 

While the result of the campaign was attained the army had 
nevertheless been very severely hnnilled, and for a time was on the 
verge of utter ruin. Rosecrans' plan was not at all carried out. 
The reason for this was the faulty posting and handling of 
McCook's wing and the fact that Bragg started in earlier in the 
execution of his attack. Rosecrans knew on the night before the 
battle that McCook's wing was not correctly placed and ordered 
changes in it. These were not carried out and Rosecrans made 
no apparent eftbrt to see that they were. 

There has been a great deal of controversy about this matter. 
One of McCook's division commanders, Johnson, stated in his 
report that McCook told him that his left was opposite the rebel 
center, and he expected to be attacked in great force next day. 
This was, in fact, true, yet McCook certainly did not make such 
dispositions as to resist any such attack even for a short time, 
and was compelled to call for such assistance as to wreck the 
whole plan of battle. If he had placed his corps in a strong 
defensive position and entrenched it he might have resisted for 
such a length of time that the main attack could make such prog- 
ress as to compel Bragg to give up his plan and conform to 
Rosecrans' movements ; just as, iiT fact, Rosecrans was forced to 
comply with those of Bragg. The battle is singular in 
that the opposing plans were identical. It has been called 
Stone's River by the Union forces and A'lurfrcesboro' b\- the 
Confederates. 



14 

For the next six months little was done — the Union Army 
occupying Murfreesboro' and the Rebel army a position near 
Tullahoma. 

Then followed the campaign which terminated in the battle 
of Chickamauga. 






LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



I" II' "illl [,[ 11; 'i\ 

013 706 722 5 



